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Introduction
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), part of the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 1995, has led to a variety of interpretations and opinions. Though its application goes beyond
matters of public health, it is this area that has come under the most scrutiny in the last fifteen
years as the gaps between developed and developing countries have widened and exposed the
health disparities between the two groups. Tensions over intellectual property and access to
newly developed medicines to treat diseases such as HIV and AIDS grew throughout the late
1990s and culminated in the 2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health.1 While intellectual
property would normally be left to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
developed and developing countries had difficulty agreeing on compulsory licenses during
negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s, and as a result the matter went to the WTO instead.2
One of the most controversial aspects of intellectual property has been access to medicines
treating HIV and AIDS. The number of those receiving anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment has
grown tremendously, which raises the question of the role the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha
Declaration on Public Health have played. One cannot attribute success entirely to the TRIPS
Agreement but at the same time one cannot deny its impact. This paper will provide an overview
of the policies and explain how if nothing else, the power to issue compulsory licenses has aided
developing countries in their efforts to provide ARV treatment for HIV/AIDS patients.

1

Reichman, Jerome H. "Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the
Options." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 37.2 (2009): 247-263. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web.
[Accessed 29 Mar. 2010]. 247-8
2
Ibid
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The Beginning, a Very Good Place to Start: The TRIPS Agreement
As stated in the introduction, TRIPS began as one of the original components of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) upon its founding in 1994 following the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations. It is little wonder that the Treaty has been the subject of so much discourse
and controversy as it placed intellectual property in the realm of commercial trade negotiations.
The TRIPS Agreement has never been limited to pharmaceutical products, however it became
apparent in the eponymous Doha round of trade negotiations begun in 2001 that pharmaceutical
patents were a unique aspect of intellectual property because of the obvious implications on
access to medicines.

Reasons for the 2001 Doha Declaration and the 2003 General Statement on Implementation
of Paragraph 6
While scholars analyzing access to medicines often cite the TRIPS agreement, they
usually mean to refer not to the original treaty but to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health, agreed on in 2001 and implemented in 2003. This key item was nothing more than a
clarification of the previously agreed upon treaty.3 This measure was necessary, however,
because many countries and companies disagreed about the impact of the Treaty’s provisions on
the trade of pharmaceutical products and public health emergencies. Despite voting on the
agreement in 2001, many refused to believe that TRIPS allowed flexibilities.4 TRIPS
Flexibilities can be understood as the safeguards in place that “limit the rights of patent holders”

3

Sirmalya Nyam. Programme Officer, Innovation and Access to Knowledge at South Centre. Personal interview. 23
March 2010.
4
Lecture on TRIPS at Global Health Course at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. 14 April 2010.
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so that WTO member countries can provide necessary medications to their people.5 The original
language implied flexibilities were available, however even those who knew this was true felt
that a clarification was necessary and that it needed to be adopted by the entire WTO.6
The lack of clarity became apparent in the case of South Africa. South Africa, which has
the largest number of people living with HIV/ADIS, purchased patented HIV/AIDS medicines in
India because it was less expensive than purchasing them in South Africa, a concept known as
parallel imports and a crucial element of the TRIPS Agreement.7 In 1998, thirty-nine
pharmaceutical companies sued in South African courts saying that the parallel imports were
illegal under the TRIPS agreement when in the fact the exact opposite was true.8 Undoubtedly
influenced by the ever-present AIDS crisis, the African member governments of the WTO,
referred to as the African Group, suggested in June 2001 the adoption of a specific text detailing
the importance of insuring access to medicines. Additional pressure came from India and Brazil,
two of the largest manufacturers of generic medicines.9 What began as a small paragraph grew to
several pages before its eventual adoption by WTO member governments on November 14, 2001
at the Doha Ministerial Conference. 10

5
International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide. New Delhi: World Health Organization Regional Office for
South-East Asia, 2009. 18
6
Lecture on TRIPS at Global Health Course at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. 14 April 2010.
7
International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide 14
8
Barnard, David. "In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98: The Global Politics of Access to Low-Cost
AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.2 (2002): 159-174. Project MUSE.
<http://muse.jhu.edu/>. [Accessed 26 Mar. 2010].
Spennemann, Christoph. Legal Expert, Intellectual Property Unit, Division on Investment and Enterprise,
UNCTAD. Personal interview. 14 April 2010.
9 Love, Roy. "Corporate wealth or public health? WTO/TRIPS flexibilities and access to HIV/AIDS antiretroviral
drugs by developing countries." Development in Practice 17.2 (2007): 208-219. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO.
Web. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2010]. See page 210
10
Velásquez, Germán. Personal interview. 13 April 2010. Director, WHO Secretariat on Public Health, Innovation
and Intellectual Property. World Health Organization. Also see “TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents”. WTO Fact
Sheet. September 2006.

Fuchs 7
Explanation and Effects of the Doha Declaration on Public Health
At its core, the Doha Declaration and its passage are most significant because it
recognized the gravity of public health problems in a trade-related document and forced the
WTO to accept that pharmaceutical patents are different than other patents. 11 12 One does not
have to be an intellectual property expert to understanding the impact of the Doha Declaration,
and while this paper does not attempt to simply duplicate already published analyses, it is crucial
to understand several important terms of the TRIPS agreement and the Doha Declaration to
understand how they have impacted the usage of newer medications such as second and third
line anti retro viral drugs.
One of the key results of the Doha Declaration was the agreement that countries had the
right to issue compulsory licenses. Compulsory licensing occurs when a country ignores the
patent protection of a specific product and authorizes another company to produce the patented
product. Interestingly, a public health emergency does not have to be present for a compulsory
license to be issued, however TRIPS does require a country to make an effort to obtain a
voluntary license before issuing a compulsory one. A compulsory license can be granted without
first attempting to obtain a voluntary license if there is an urgent need for the product, if it is
produced solely for government or non-commercial use, or if it is used to “remedy anticompetitive behaviour”.13
The question that remained following the Doha Declaration was how countries that
lacked domestic manufacturing capability, often developing or least developed countries (LDCs),
could benefit from issuing compulsory licenses if there were no firms to receive them. Article
31(f), of the original TRIPS agreement, a subject discussed in a wealth of academic literature,
11

Lecture on TRIPS at Graduate Institute
Velásquez, Germán
13
International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide 81 and lecture at Graduate Institute
12
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stated that any production arising out of a compulsory license had to be primarily for the
domestic market. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration thus instructed the Council for TRIPS to “find
an expeditious solution to this problem…before the end of 2002”.14 In August 30, 2003, the
Decision of the General Council allowed countries unable to manufacture medicines on their
own to import from another country as long as both issued compulsory licenses, thus allowing a
system of parallel importation. 15 Explained above in the case of South Africa in 1999 and 2000,
parallel importation is sometimes referred to as “grey imports” and gives the impression that it is
of questionable legality (leaning towards the black market) despite the clarification provided by
the Doha Declaration. Because Paragraph 6 is part of the Doha Declaration of 2001 and the
General Council Statement on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 (referred to as both the “WTO
waiver” and “Paragraph 6 solution”) occurred in 2003, the two are often grouped together in
discussion of parallel imports.

Legalizing Arbitrage
The Declaration and Paragraph 6 solution thus legalized a certain degree of arbitrage, the
technical term for making a profit by buying a product at a low price in one country and selling it
at a higher price in another country. However, regulatory controls established by TRIPS, the
Doha Declaration, and the General Council Statement make parallel imports of pharmaceuticals
different than the sorts of arbitrage that lead to major trade disputes because it only applies to
countries that are unable to produce the medicines for themselves and forbids the sale of the
medicines in any market other than the country of need and the country of supply.16 The

14

Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Paragraph 6. 14 Nov. 2001.
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm>. [Accessed 21 April 2010].
15
Syam interview
16
“TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents”. WTO Fact Sheet. September 2006. 6
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medicines are often marked differently and placed in special packaging to prevent illegal
reselling in other countries.17 While concern for medicines ending up in the wrong hands had
been an argument used by pharmaceutical companies against parallel imports, unique product
labeling has proven to be simple way to insure that medicines sold at different prices for one
country will not affect sales in another country.

Effects of the 2003 General Council Decision on Paragraph 6
The original thinking behind the 2003 General Council Decision was for Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration to become an official section of the TRIPS Agreement. While the 2003
Waiver adopted Paragraph 6 as Article 31bis, it remains to be verified by the entire WTO, which
has consistently pushed back the deadline for adoption, currently set to take place in 2011.
While this is hardly in agreement with the “expeditious solution” prescribed by the TRIPS
Agreement, the effect would simply be a formality at this point as the 2003 Waiver gave
Paragraph 6, the proposed Article 31bis, its legal authority.18

Paragraph 6 System and its one-time use – What does it mean and does it indicate success?
Much of the debate over the Paragraph 6 system centers on the fact that it has only been
implemented once, in a parallel import agreement between Canada and Rwanda in 2007. Canada
announced in September 2003, one month after the WTO waiver, or Paragraph 6 solution, was
approved.19 A Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, Apotex, agreed to manufacture
and export to Rwanda a supply of fixed dose combinations (FDCs) of zidovidine, lamivudine,
17

WTO spokesperson. Personal interview. 25 March 2010.
WTO spokesperson interview and Nyam interview
19
“Members ask: Is the ‘Par. 6’ system on intellectual property and health working?” WTO 2010 News Items. World
Trade Organization, 2 March 2010. <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_02mar10_e.htm>.
[Accessed 25 March 2010].
18
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and nevirapine.20 Interestingly, the exchange was initiated by Canada and not by Rwanda, the
country in need of the medicine. Apotex asked the Canadian health authorities for approval of
their generic drug in December 2005, and did not select Rwanda is its country for export until
July 2007.21 In a meeting on March 10, 2010, Canadian representatives presented their timeline
of the project and pointed out obtaining the actual compulsory license only required two weeks.
Responding to claims of an inefficient system, the Canadian delegation explained that it was
eight months before Canadian legislation was adjusted to comply with the 2003 Waiver, one year
for identifying a country for export, and two months between Apotex’s application for a
voluntary license from three patent owners and it application for a compulsory license from the
Canadian government. Including the Rwandan procurement process, the entire project lasted
from September 2003 through September 2009.22

The Actual Goal of ‘Paragraph 6’
As was recently emphasized WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, the goal of the
Paragraph 6 system was not to issue compulsory licenses, but rather to help increase the
availability of medicines at lower prices.23 In the past ten years the cost of medicines, including
antiretroviral drugs that are used to treat HIV and AIDS, have decreased and the numbers of
those receiving ARV treatment has skyrocketed. This has occurred for a variety of reasons,
including the fact that organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders
(MSF) and the Gates Foundation have found ways to purchase drugs at lower costs and because
there has been an outpouring of AIDS relief efforts such as UN AIDS, the Global Fund and
20

International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide 86
“Members ask: Is the ‘Par. 6’ system on intellectual property and health working?” and interview with WTO
spokesperson
22
Ibid
23
WTO interview

21
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others that have been quite effective in increasing the amount of ARV treatment in African
countries and throughout the world.

Compulsory Licensing as a Negotiating Tool
Compulsory licenses have served as an important bargaining chip for governments
negotiating with pharmaceutical companies.24 While one cannot deny of course that the
Paragraph 6 system has only been used once, experts agree that its use is by no means the best
measure of whether access to drugs has increased.25 An economic principle known as the
specificity rule states that the best way to deal with a policy problem is to correct it at the source.
Thus if drug prices are to become lower there was must be a carrot or stick for pharmaceutical
companies, and the stick can be the possibility of “legal sanctions”.26 Compulsory licenses act as
the stick because the threat of one can be enough to convince a company to agree to a voluntary
license. Patent owners often prefer issuing a voluntary license than dealing with a compulsory
one because they can receive higher revenue from a license they negotiate than one issued by a
local government.27 While countries issuing compulsory licenses are still obligated to pay
“adequate compensation” to patent owners, the 2003 Waiver stated that payment only needed to
be collected once in the exporting country and not in the importing country as well. 28 While the
more developed exporting country may be able to pay more than the less developed importing
country, there is no guarantee that a government and a patent owner will agree on what
constitutes adequate compensation.

24

Syam
WTO spokesperson interview
26
Reichman 254
27
Syam and WTO spokesperson
28
Reichman 249
25
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History, Theory and Reasoning Behind Pharmaceutical Patents
The parallel import system included in the 2003 decision had obvious benefits for the
large generic producing countries such as Brazil, India, and China. 29 An additional impact of
the 2003 Decision was the extension of deadlines for transitioning to the conditions outlined in
the original TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. The original January 1, 2000 deadlines
for developing countries to accept all of the TRIPS provisions, such as instituting both product
and process patents, was extended to 2000 and the original 2006 deadline for least developed
countries was extended to 2016.30 Included in the texts was the agreement that India would have
until 2005 to adjust its patent laws to grant patents on products and not just on processes.31
India’s patent laws historically did not recognize a new combination of chemical compounds as
patent-worthy, meaning that if a pharmaceutical company reconfigured an already patented drug
to be manufactured differently it would most likely not receive a patent in India.
India has become known as “the pharmacy of the developing world”32 due to its wellestablished generic drug industry, which can be traced back to the patent system the country
inherited from Great Britain after gaining independence in 1947. At the time of the Paris

29

Reichman 249

30

“Transition provisions”. Pharmaceutical patents and the TRIPS Agreement. Technical note. WTO. 21 Sept. 2006.
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm>. [Accessed 21 April 2010]. Also see “TRIPS
and pharmaceutical patents”. WTO Fact Sheet. September 2006. 5
31
Anonymous WTO expert. Phone interview. 22 April 2010.
32

von Schoen-Angerer, Tido. “India: Will Pharma, trade agreements shut down the Pharmacy of the Developing
World?”. 19 April 2010. Editorial published on MSF Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines website and in
Huffington Post. <http://www.msfaccess.org/main/access-patents/india-will-pharma-trade-agreements-shut-downthe-pharmacy-of-the-developing-world/>. [Accessed 26 April 2010].
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Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property in 1883, one of the earliest intellectual
property agreements, many countries did not grant patent protection on pharmaceuticals.33
In India, the Tex Chand committee in 1949 and the Ayyangar committee in 1957 decided to
grant process patents on foodstuffs and medicines for only five years. The five year limit meant
generic versions of medicines were developed more rapidly than in other countries.34 Today the
lowest-priced drugs are found in India, despite adjustments that the country has had to adopt as a
result of the TRIPS Agreement. Despite the fact that TRIPS did not define what is considered
novel or inventive, it did require countries to grant patents on pharmaceuticals as products and
ones that would last at least twenty years. India was allowed to have a ‘mailbox system’ for
patent applications between 1995 and 2005, which meant countries were able to apply for
product patents but the applications would not be examined until 2005. Even today there
continue to be disputes in India over product patents.35 In 2007, Novartis brought a lawsuit in
India over their leukemia drug Gleevec. Novartis had used a different formula that allowed the
medicine to be absorbed in the bloodstream faster and claimed it was a new drug deserving a
new patent, however the Indian patent office disagreed.36 While twenty years is a reasonable
length of time for a patent, it is important to note that a twenty-year patent on a computer device
has dramatically different effects than a twenty-year patent on a medicine.37 There are those who
believe that a shorter patent duration could be beneficial in increasing access to medicines, but

33

Syam
Syam and “History of Indian Patent System”. <http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/PatentHistory.htm>. [Accessed
23 April 2010].
35
WTO lecture at Graduate Institute
36
“Novartis concerned Indian court ruling will discourage investments in innovation needed to bring better
medicines to patients”. Media Releases – Novartis. 6 Aug. 2007.
<http://cws.huginonline.com/N/134323/PR/200708/1144199_5_2.html>. [Accessed 24 April 2010].
37
Dyer, Owen. “BMJ: New 20 year patents threaten to end AIDS drugs for developing countries”. MSF Article.
Médecins Sans Frontières. 4 December 2004.
<http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=ECEDF48F-9D6F-45DDAFCD7E55622F351B&method=full_html>. [Accessed 23 March 2010].
34
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the countries in favor of this are in the minority and worry that any advocacy for shorter patent
lengths could risk increasing the standard patent durations. 38

The Effect of Bilateral Trade Agreements
Many of the flexibilities obtained through the Doha Declaration that are beneficial for
developing countries are at risk of becoming diminished by new bilateral trade agreements.39
While the strengthening of intellectual property rights through the TRIPS Agreement was
beneficial to pharmaceutical companies, many were not pleased with the results of the Doha
Declaration and the 2003 Wavier decision. Companies “persuaded the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) to recapture lost ground by means of Bilateral or Regional Free Trade
Agreements with developing countries.40 Because of WTO principles that forbid giving most
favored nation status to any country, any conditions extended to one country by another could
theory apply to the former country’s dealings with every WTO member.41 Scholar Jerome
Reichman also claims that the pharmaceutical industry “flooded the world with misleading and
self-serving interpretations of relevant legal instruments,” which is definitely not helpful in the
realm of intellectual property where is confusing enough without the extra interpretations
intended to skew decision making in one direction or another.
There are several views of how pharmaceutical companies have fared under TRIPS and
Doha. They gained an increased recognition of intellectual property rights, but would have
preferred if the 2003 clarification had not come about as it emphasized how the Doha

38

Syam
Ibid
40
Reichman 249
41
Syam
39
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Declaration can be used to the benefit of individual countries.42 There is one view that the
companies “shot themselves in the foot” after the initial TRIPS Agreement considering
cooperation has increased dramatically between the industry and the World Health Organization.
Some of their initial complaints had reasonable merit, such as their fear of medicines destined for
one country ending up in another country illegally, however this was easily resolved with
different colored pills and special packaging. 43 All in all, the pharmaceutical industry emerged
as the biggest winner from the TRIPS Agreement.44 Scholar Frederick M. Abbott concludes the
“Patent pendulum is shifting in a major way in favor of Pharma interests”.45 Reichman writes
that “developing countries lost the war” in losing the ability to easily reverse-engineer medicines
to produce generics.46 However, many companies are still upset with then-USTR Robert Zoellick
for in effect giving away too much because countries have the renewed power to issue
compulsory licenses.47 It becomes difficult to analyze the effectiveness of this power because
countries can succeed in negotiations by not issuing compulsory licenses.

Pharmaceutical Industry’s Perspective
From the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, the TRIPS Agreement and Doha
Declaration would not have occurred without the push from the AIDS crisis.48 While negotiators
from developing countries preceding the Doha Declaration were very clear on not limiting the
impact of any new agreement, there were efforts made by the United States to limit the

42

Phone interview with an additional WTO expert
WTO spokesperson interview
44
Reichman 248
45
Abbott, Frederick M. “The WTO medicines decision : world pharmaceutical trade and the protection of public
health”. American Journal of International Law. 99(2) Apr. 2005: p.317-358. LexisNexis Academic.
<http://www.lexisnexis.com>. [Accessed 23 March 2010].
46
Reichman 247-8
47
Lecture at Graduate Institute
48
Retired Merck executive. Personal interview. 29 March 2010.
43

Fuchs 16
applicability either by disease or geographic region. In February 2003, at a Tokyo miniministerial meeting, USTR Robert Zoellick proposed limiting any solutions to Africa in
exchange for allowing broad language on the “scope of diseases”.49 An article published in
October 2001 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) became fairly
influential in pharmaceutical circles because it concluded that patents were not the main obstacle
to treatment of HIV/AIDS in African countries. At the time of publication, authors Amir Attaran
and Lee Gillespie-White found that of the fifteen anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) in use, only
thirteen patents existed in Africa, and eleven were in South Africa alone.50 While it is important
to note that Attaran received a grant from Merck after the publication of his article,51 his findings
are nonetheless still significant. In the 1990s there were few if any patents on ARVs in India, the
country of supply, and relatively few in African countries, the countries of use, which begs the
question of why everyone looks immediately to the TRIPS Agreement.52 Even a current
pharmaceutical executive agreed that for the most part the TRIPS Agreement is irrelevant to
fighting AIDS in Africa.53 While executives make the important point that a comprehensive
public health solution and not simply cheaper drugs is necessary to ameliorate the AIDS crisis,
the fact that drugs have become cheaper in the past fifteen to twenty years has undoubtedly
removed other barriers to treatment.

49

Abbot 8
Attaran, Amir, and Lee Gillespie-White. "Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to Aids Treatment
in Africa?" JAMA 286.15 (2001): 1886-92.
51
Attaran, as well as Velasquez interview
52
Interview with retired Merck executive
53
Pharmaceutical official specializing in International Aid. Personal interview. 16 April 2010.
50
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Price Discrimination: Avoiding bad press and fulfilling a moral obligation
While many pharmaceutical companies originally resented54 the Doha Declaration placing them
in a position similar to that of a public health authority, they eventually realized it was in their
interest to sell drugs at lower prices in poorer countries to both preserve their public image and
fulfill a moral obligation. Pharmaceutical companies now use a variety of different prices
depending on the specific market, however this was not always the case. Price discrimination is a
key element of microeconomic theory,55 but at the same time there have been some specific
cases where monopoly pricing was more beneficial to the companies involved. In addition, for
many years pharmaceutical companies were hesitant to charge different prices for the same drugs
out of fear that customers in wealthy countries would not tolerate it. Even today companies have
to be careful because one cannot automatically “expect the rich to be generous” if they have to
pay one thousand dollars for a medicine and others only have to pay one dollar.56 Fortunately for
AIDS patients in developing countries, however, this line of thinking has not impeded their care
because companies have found a common ground between economic incentives and moral
obligations.

Economic Arguments for Price-Discrimination:
Jerome Reichman points out, “most economists would agree that in a perfect world”
pharmaceutical companies would ‘avoid risk of compulsory licenses by pricing products close to
the marginal cost of production so that poor people around the world could afford them’.57
Reichman goes on to suggest that pricing based on per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) for

54

Retired Merck executive
Basu, Sudip Ranjan. Economist, International Trade Division, UNCTAD. Personal interview. 14 April 2010.
56
Current pharmaceutical executive
57
Reichman 251

55
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example, would be an objective way of determining price differences and “reduce the
deadweight loss” created when only rich consumers purchase medicines.58 The unfortunate truth,
however, is that from a purely economic standpoint there are many arguments for nondiscriminatory pricing of pharmaceuticals. Reichman analyses the economic analysis of several
scholars on the subject, such as Aidan Hollis, Sean Flynn, and Micheal Palmedo, who have
written about the “Problem of the Convex Demand Curve” for “essential goods in countries with
large income disparities”. In these particular markets firms actually maximize their profits by
‘setting a price unaffordable to at least ninety-percent of the people’.59 Hollis’ argument is based
on data comparisons between South Africa, a country with a large income disparity, and
Norway, a country with a high level of income equality.
While breaking away from this logic can require companies to act against their own selfinterest, these same companies are in a unique line of work where their decisions have
undeniable implications that can go as far as matters of life and death. Author James Love makes
the blunt but accurate claim that even a minimal deadweight loss can lead to dead bodies.60
Despite any economic arguments to the contrary, however, “pharmaceutical companies
have to have discriminatory pricing” simply because it is the right thing to do. In the 1980s when
the AIDS crisis first emerged a diagnosis was almost the same as a death sentence, because no
treatments were available until nearly ten years later. AIDS has now become a livable disease,
and “No one has ever been criticized for selling a pill at fifty cents a day in poor countries”.
While some companies feared that charging lower prices would be a “one-way corridor” to
conciliatory pricing, when they finally implemented lower prices the sky did not fall and no one

58

Ibid
Reichman 252, citing endnote #59
60
Ibid
59
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asked for compulsory licenses on Viagra (at least not successfully). 61 In the end companies do
not suffer tremendous monetary losses and in fact gain good publicity for appearing in touch
with the reality of public health crises.
Medical Ethics and Humanitarian Perspective
There are many who continue to see the TRIPS regime as an impediment and not an aid
to increasing access to medicines in developing countries. There are criticisms of the Paragraph 6
system as too complex for a developing country without any patent infrastructure.62 Professor
Robert Bird points out there are 1.7 billion people in world without access to essential medicines
and that there are potential “social costs” of compulsory licensing, such as a decrease in foreign
direct investment.63 While it is true that a country’s intellectual property (IP) system can
influence a company’s investment decisions, a more liberal IP system could actually encourage
generic firms to invest even if it deters larger corporations.64 In general however, there has been
no defined or proven relationship between intellectual property and foreign direct investment.65
Many pharmaceutical companies have aid programs where they either donate medicines
or sell them at reduced prices to specific populations, and while these can sometimes be more for
show than impact,66 they nonetheless remain an important way for patients to obtain patented
medicines. This can be viewed as an extension or element of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR), but at the same time it is also fulfilling the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 67 Article 25, Section 1 states, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living

61

Retired Merck executive. Egypt actually did attempt to issue a compulsory license for Viagra but the matter was
“tainted by appearance of impropriety and self dealing” (See Reichman 254, endnote #109)
62
Velasquez interview
63
Reichman 253, endnotes #91 and 92
64
Basu interview
65
Reichman 256
66
Velasquez interview
67
Basu interview
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adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care…”.68 The backing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has
been to the benefit of humanitarian organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors
Without Borders, which played a key role in lobbying for the Doha Declaration in the first place.
However some believe that the MSF and others like it have taken matters too far in an effort to
maintain the momentum generated by the TRIPS Agreement.69 The role of organizations such as
MSF in the TRIPS/Doha debate has come into question recently with the March 2010 meeting at
the WTO.70 While it is hard to argue that MSF’s “Campaign for Access to Medicines” is a bad
thing, one must ask if developing countries deserve more than free or reduced-priced medicines
but full-picture approach as well. 71 Pharmaceutical companies cannot, however, provide a
complete public health solution, as that ability rests primarily with local health ministries.
The health needs of developing countries continues to be neglected in general simply
because there is not a large market potential involved. Market-driven research and development
is often not directed at diseases, such as Tuberculosis, that are generally found in poor
populations.72 While the small market might make pharmaceutical companies more willing to
sell drugs at lower prices, it also makes it difficult for local producers to emerge. Selling
antiretroviral drugs is not the most profitable endeavor,73 which brings the matter back to the
realm of charity or corporate social responsibility when it really should be in the realm of public
68
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health. However, local health infrastructure is not always reliable in countries where even
doctors and nurses, not to mention multitudes of others, have difficulty feeding their families. If
the whole situation sounds more like an exercise in circular logic that is due the fact that in many
cases policy proposals on the subject are an exercise in circular logic. This pattern only
highlights the complexity of the matter and others like it where market forces conflict with
ethical desires.

TRIPS in Action: Thailand
Other than the parallel imports between South Africa and Rwanda, the other primary
country example is Thailand. In 2006 Thailand issued a government use compulsory license for
Effavirenz, an important antiretroviral drug under patent at the time by US pharmaceutical
company Merck.74 With the exception of “women of childbearing potential”, most adults can
take Effavirenz in combination with other HIV/AIDS medicines and experience relatively few
side effects that might otherwise impede treatment.75 Thailand decided it wanted to import
generic versions of Effavirenz from India and eventually manufacture the generic domestically.
Merck initially proposed a price that was twice that of the Indian generic, though they later
lowered their price to twenty percent above the price in India. 76While the actions of Thai
Government were completely legitimate under the TRIPS regime,77 the United States responded
by placing Thailand on its “Special 301” list of countries violating intellectual property rights.
The reprisal of the United States was not in concordance with international trade agreements, and
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the United States even lost a WTO ruling on the matter.78 In January 2007 Thailand issued
additional compulsory licenses for Kaletra, an important second-line ARV, and Plavix, used to
treat heart disease.79 In response Abbott Laboratories, a US firm, withdrew registration of
Kaletra in Thailand prompting outrage by Médecins Sans Frontières.80 There were some
accusations against the Thai government for making a profit with in producing the Efavirenz
generic, however in reality any profits made were minimal at best and went back to the Thailand
public health system, which now accounts for around ten percent of the Thai national budget.81

Alternatives to Compulsory Licenses
There are a variety of policy proposals aimed at lowering the costs of medicines without
using compulsory licenses. One can follow the Belgian model of avoiding Paragraph 6/Article
31bis entirely and using Articles 8 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement instead.82 Professor Kevin
Outterson at Boston University School of Law has proposed a “buy out scheme” where
medicines would be distributed free of patents in poor countries with monopoly pricing in OECD
countries. 83 Buying in bulk, or pooled procurement strategies, could be very practical for
treating patients in India because of the countries generic manufacturing capabilities.84 Price
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discrimination tools can be included in medicine distribution programs.85 A movement that has
grown among research universities in the United States in recent years is the group Universities
Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), where universities conducting pharmaceutical research
negotiate with companies to insure the benefits of their work reaches as many people as
possible.86 Some have even suggested applying the Linux computer operating system open
source approach, though the applicability of this to pharmaceutical research is remains to be
seen.87

Conclusions – How does one evaluate success?
In determining the success of any government or international policy depends largely on
the questions used to evaluate it, and the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration are no
exception. Jerome Reichman makes the important observation that there are many risks in
comparing Thailand’s use of government compulsory licenses and Canada’s parallel import
system with Rwanda. Since 2003, Cameroon, Ghana, Eritrea, Zambia, and Mozambique have
issued compulsory licenses for various HIV/AIDS medicines.88 Whether or not this has benefited
HIV/AIDS patients in these countries requires further examination of patent and import data that
are beyond the scope of this paper. One can safely conclude, however, that at the very least the
ability to impose compulsory licenses has allowed these countries to have more leverage in
international negotiations.
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In reflecting on his work in intellectual property with the World Health Organization, Dr
Germán Velásquez admits that the WHO and other organizations were mistaken in emphasizing
the powers of compulsory licenses.89 Jerome Reichman observes that “minimum standards of
patent protection” have increased over time “in keeping with the expressed goals of the Paris
Union [of 1883].” However, “every attempt to limit” compulsory licenses from the state has
“invariably resulted” in an increase in power of compulsory licenses on the international level.90
Thus, recognition of intellectual property rights has increased alongside compulsory licenses.
Compulsory licenses have always been part of intellectual property law, but whether or not legal
scholars intended them to reach their current level of power in global health is at minimum a
debatable matter. There is no question that the situation of those with HIV/AIDS in developing
countries has increased dramatically in the last ten years, but whether one can connect this to the
Doha Declaration is unclear. If nothing else the subjects raised in the discussion of TRIPS and
Doha are important reminders of the powers and responsibilities of both countries and
corporations, and that a balanced perspective must continue in future policy negotiations.
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